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Abstract
This article will review the traditional approach to nationalization and assess the new theories
in light of the FSIA [the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976], Alfred Dunhill, Inc. v.
Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976) [Dunhill], and recent case law.
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George Kahale, III*
INTRODUCTION
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Alfred Dunhill, Inc.
v. Republic of Cuba' and the passage of the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act of 19762 (FSIA), the sovereign character of acts of
nationalization was rarely disputed. 3 Since the FSIA and Dunhill,
however, new theories have been developed which characterize
nationalization as a commercial act or an act in connection with a
commercial activity. 4 The issue goes to the heart of both the FSIA's
commercial activity exception to immunity 5 and the act of state
doctrine" in nationalization cases. This Article will review the traditional approach to nationalizations and assess the new theories in
light of the FSIA, Dunhill and recent case law.
I. OVERVIEW OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND
ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE
A.

Sovereign Immunity

Sovereign immunity is an internationally recognized doctrine
under which the courts of one state will decline to exercise jurisdiction over another state without its consent. 7 Although most nations
give effect to some form of sovereign immunity, the precise circum-

* Partner, Curtis, Mallet-Prevost, Colt & Mosle, New York. B.A. 1971, Hunter College;
J.D. 1974, New York University School of Law.
1. 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
3
2
2. Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (1976) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 13 2(a)( )(4), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602-1611 (1976)).
3. See inJra text accompanying notes 28-43.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 44-84. For purposes of this Article, no distinction is
made between the terms "nationalization" and "expropriation."
5. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1976).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 15-24.
7. H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8-9, reprintedin 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 6604, 6606-07 [hereinafter cited as HousE REPORT]. See Jet Line Servs., Inc. v. M/V
Marsa El Hariga, 462 F. Supp. 1165, 1168-69 (D. Md. 1978).
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stances under which immunity is granted vary from country to
country. 8 At first, the absolute theory of immunity prevailed, affording foreign states immunity from all suits.' With the increasing
participation of states in commercial activities, a trend developed
toward restricting the scope of state immunity to suits based on
sovereign acts. 0
The United States formally adopted the "restrictive theory" of
sovereign immunity in 1952.11 Yet, despite consensus as to the
principle, there remained substantial uncertainty as to the outcome
of any given case, largely due to the absence of a consistent method

8. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 9. See also State Immunity Act, 1978, ch. 33;
European Convention on State Immunity, May 16, 1972, Europ. T.S. No. 74, reprintedin 11
I.L.M. 470 (1972).
9. See The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). Although
most Western nations long ago adopted the restrictive theory, the absolute theory of sovereign
immunity retained its vitality in the United Kingdom until the passage of the State Immunity
Act. HousE REPORT, supra note 7, at 8.

10. Victory Transp. Inc. v. Comisaria Gen. de Abastecimientos y Transps., 336 F.2d
354, 360 (2d Cir. 1964) (restrictive theory is designed "to accommodate the interest of
individuals doing business with foreign governments in having their legal rights determined
by the courts, with the interest of foreign governments in being free to perform certain
political acts without undergoing the embarassment or hindrance of defending the propriety
of such acts before foreign courts"), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965). See also HousE
REPORT, supra note 7, at 6-7.

11. This position was adopted by the Department of State in the "Tate Letter." Letter
from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor, Dep't of State, to Philip B. Perlman, Acting
Attorney General of the United States (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEV'T ST. BULL. 984
(1952). Prior to the FSIA, the State Department played a central role in the sovereign
immunity decision-making process. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 6-7; Sovereign
Immunity Decisions of the Department of State (M. Sandler, D. Vagts & B. Ristau eds.) in
1977 DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1017 app. (J. Boyd ed.

1979). Foreign governments had the option of petitioning the State Department for suggestions of immunity. The Department's decisions on such petitions were held binding upon the
courts. See Republic of Mex. v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 34-36; Ex parte Republic of Peru, 318
U.S. 578, 588 (1943). Although the State Department adopted the restrictive theory of
immunity from suit in the Tate Letter, it continued to adhere to the absolute theory of
immunity from execution. HousE REPORT, supra note 7, at 8. The latter remained in effect
until the passage of the FSIA, which liberalized the rules with respect to execution on the
property of a foreign state. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1609-1611 (1976). There are still certain circumstances under which suit may be brought against a foreign state but a judgment may not be
executed. See Kahale & Vega, Immunity and Jurisdiction: Toward a Uniform Body of Law
in Actions Against Foreign States, 18 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 211, 221-22 (1979). Compare
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1976) (jurisdictional immunity denied if suit based on commercial
activity having specified contacts with the United States) with 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(2) (1976)
(where jurisdiction is based on commercial activity provision, immunity of foreign government's property from execution denied only where property is used for commercial activity
upon which the claim is based).
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for distinguishing between acts jure gestionis (private or commercial acts) and acts jure imperii (sovereign acts) .12 In 1976, Congress
codified the restrictive theory in the FSIA and selected the "nature
of the act" test for determining whether a particular act constitutes
"commercial activity."' 3 Section 1605(a)(2) of the FSIA, the commercial activity exception to the FSIA's general rule of jurisdictional immunity for foreign states, denies such immunity in cases
in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried
on in the United States by the foreign state; or upon an act
performed in the United States in connection with a commercial
activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the
territory of the United States in connection with a commercial
and that act causes a direct
activity of the foreign state elsewhere
4
States.1
United
the
in
effect

12. Victory Transp., 336 F.2d at 358-62. See injra text accompanying notes 28-33.
Another source of uncertainty was uneven application of the restrictive theory by the State
Department. See Spacil v. Crowe, 489 F.2d 614 (5th Cir. 1974) (suggestion of immunity from
suit in commercial case); Isbrandtsen Tankers, Inc. v. President of India, 446 F.2d 1198 (2d
Cir.) (suggestion of immunity from suit in commercial case involving a waiver of immunity),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971).
13. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602, 1603(d), 1605(a)(2) (1976). Under this test, the nature of the act,
rather than the purpose for which it is performed, is considered controlling. See infra text
accompanying notes 29-31. The legislative history indicates that the codification of the
restrictive theory of sovereign immunity was the primary purpose of the FSIA. HousE
REPORT, supra note 7, at 6-7. See Velidor v. L/P/G Benghazi, 653 F.2d 812, 817 (3d Cir.
1981), cert. dismissed, 455 U.S. 929 (1982); Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Rep.
of Nig., 647 F.2d 300, 310 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982); Jet Line Servs.,
Inc. v. M/V Marsa El Hariga, 462 F. Supp. 1165, 1170 (D. Md. 1978). Another purpose was
to promote uniformity of decision and depoliticize the decision-making process by placing the
responsibility for sovereign immunity determinations in the hands of the courts. See National
Airmotive Corp. v. Government of Iran, 499 F. Supp. 401, 406 (D.D.C. 1980); 28 U.S.C. §
1602 (1976); Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in Suits Against Foreign States: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Admin. Law and Governmental Relations of the Comm. on the Judiciary of
the House of Representatives, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 26-27, 34-35, 58-60, 88-89 (1976); HousE
REPORT, supra note 7, at 7. See also supra notes 11-12.
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1976). In actions brought against foreign states in federal
courts, the FSIA integrates the issues of sovereign immunity and jurisdiction, hinging the
latter upon the former. A general rule of immunity from the jurisdiction of both state and
federal courts in the United States is set forth in section 1604, followed by various exceptions
to that rule in section 1605. Apart from the commercial activity provision, those exceptions
relate to cases involving: waivers of immunity; certain expropriation claims; certain claims
involving rights in property in the United States acquired by succession or gift or immovable
property located in the United States; certain noncommercial tort claims; and certain admiralty claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1), (a)(3)-(5), (b) (1976). Immunity exceptions also exist for
cases in which the foreign state appears as plaintiff and a counterclaim is asserted. 28 U.S.C.
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Act of State Doctrine

The act of state doctrine is related to the doctrine of sovereign
immunity, with some important differences. The classic formulation of the act of state doctrine appears in the Supreme Court's
decision in Underhill v. Hernandez: 15
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence
of every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will
not sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another
done within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of
such acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed
of by sovereign powers as between themselves.' 6

Unlike sovereign immunity, the act of state doctrine is a substantive
rule of federal law which must be considered in all cases in which
the validity of a foreign government's action is called into question, 7 even when the government itself is not named as a defendant
in the case.' 8 It is not a principle addressed to the court's jurisdiction but one which is applied by the court in reaching a determination on the merits of a case.19

§ 1607 (1976). Section 1330(a) provides that if a foreign state is not entitled to jurisdictional
immunity with respect to any claim, the federal district courts shall have original jurisdiction
over that claim. See Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nig., 103 S. Ct. 1962 (1983). Under
section 1330(b), personal jurisdiction exists over a foreign state with respect to any claim over
which the federal court has subject matter jurisdiction provided that service of process is
made in accordance with the exclusive service provisions of the FSIA. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330(a)(b), 1604, 1605, 1608 (1976). See Kahale & Vega, supra note 11, at 224-26. Thus, the
commercial activity and jurisdictional issues are linked. If a plaintiff's claim is based on a
commercial activity of a foreign state having the requisite nexus with the United States under
section 1605(a)(2), immunity will be denied and the federal courts will have personal and
subject matter jurisdiction under section 1330, assuming that service of process is made under
section 1608. It should be noted, however, that section 1605(a)(2) is not the only avenue to
jurisdiction. Immunity may also be denied, and jurisdiction therefore found to exist, if any
other immunity exception is applicable. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a)-(b) (1976).
15. 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
16. Id. at 252.
17. That the act of state doctrine is a federal principle applicable in actions brought in
state courts was made clear in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 421-27
(1964).
18. See, e.g., Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918); Ricaud v. American
Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304 (1918); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977). The Court observed in Sabbatino: "Perhaps the most typical act
of state case involves the original owner or his assignee suing one not in association with the
expropriating state who has had 'title' transferred to him." 376 U.S. at 435.
19. See Ricaud, 246 U.S. at 309-10.
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Act of state cases often involve legislative or administrative
actions of foreign governments, which are generally considered
sovereign in nature.20 In Dunhill, however, the Court was faced
with the issue whether the doctrine applied to a repudiation of a
commercial obligation to pay money by commercial agents of the
Cuban government. 2 ' In a five-to-four decision, the Court held that
the repudiation was not an act of state because there was no evidence that the agents were exercising the sovereign authority of the
Cuban government. 22 Four justices went further and indicated that
the act of state doctrine would not have applied even if Cuba had
23
purported to exercise its sovereign powers to repudiate the debt.
While this view did not command the support of a majority of the
Court, Dunhill has been cited as supporting a "commercial activ24
ity" exception to the act of state doctrine.
The characterization of nationalizations as either "sovereign"
or "commercial" acts is thus a central issue with respect to both the
20. See, e.g., Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (nationalization); Underhill v. Hernandez, 168
U.S. 250 (1897) (refusal to grant passport); Allied Bank Int'l v. Banco Credito Agricola de
Cartago, 566 F. Supp. 1440 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (decree requiring approval for foreign debt
repayment and denial of approval); Frankel v. Banco Nacional de Mex., No. 82 Civ. 6457
(S.D.N.Y. May 31, 1983) (exchange control regulations); Frolova v. USSR, 558 F. Supp. 358
(N.D. Ill. 1983) (denial of emigration); Bokkelen v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 432 F.
Supp. 329 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (denial of import- licenses); French v. Banco Nacional de Cuba,
23 N.Y.2d 46, 242 N.E.2d 704, 295 N.Y.S.2d 433 (1968) (decision that currency conversion
certificates would not be honored).
21. Alfred Dunhill, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976).
22. Id. at 690-95.
23. Id. at 695. See infra text accompanying notes 62-67.
24. Empresa Cubana Exportadora de Azucar y sus Derivados v. Lamborn & Co., 652
F.2d 231, 238 (2d Cir. 1981); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68, 73 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977). See also Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 594 F.2d
48, 52 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 903 (1980), vacated and remanded, 103 S. Ct.
1244 (1983); Mirabella v. Banco Indus. de la Rep. Argen., 101 Misc. 2d 767, 769, 421
N.Y.S.2d 960, 961-62 (Sup. Ct. 1979). A footnote in the section-by-section analysis contained
in the House Report states:
Under the act of state doctrine, United States Courts may refuse to adjudicate the
validity of purely public acts of foreign sovereigns, as distinguished from commercial acts, committed and effective within their own territory ....
The committee has found it unnecessary to address the act of state doctrine in
this legislation since decisions such as that in the Dunhill case demonstrate that our
courts already have considerable guidance enabling them to reject improper assertions of the act of state doctrine. For example, it appears that the doctrine would not
apply to the cases covered by [the FSIA], whose touchstone is a concept of "commercial activity" involving significant jurisdictional contacts with this country.
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 20 n.I. See National Am. Corp. v. Federal Rep. of Nig., 448
F. Supp. 622, 640 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) ("By emphasizing that commercial activity serves as the
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sovereign immunity and act of state doctrines in nationalization
cases. In suits against the foreign state itself, resolution of the issue
25
may be dispositive of the jurisdictional question under the FSIA.
In other cases, or in cases in which jurisdiction over a foreign state
is acquired other than through the FSIA's commercial activity exception to immunity,2 6 the characterization of a nationalization
may determine the outcome of the act of state issue and conse27
quently the merits of the case.

II.

THE TREATMENT OF NATIONALIZATIONS
PRIOR TO THE FSIA AND DUNHILL

Prior to the FSIA and Dunhill, nationalization was considered
the classic example of an act of state. 28 This characterization
seemed to flow from each of the tests prevailing prior to the FSIA
for distinguishing between acts jure gestionis and acts jure imperii
in immunity cases.
The initial tests to be formulated were known as the "purpose
of the act" and "nature of the act" tests.29 Under the former, an act
was considered sovereign if performed for a public purpose. 30 Since
all acts of a government are arguably performed for some public
purpose, it is not clear that any activity of a government could be
considered commercial under the purpose test. On the other hand,
touchstone of both the Dunhill decision and sovereign immunity under the Act, Congress
seems to be suggesting that both theories be interpreted in tandem."). Cf. International Ass'n
of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354, 1360 (9th Cir. 1981) ("The act
of state doctrine is not diluted by the commercial activity exception which limits the doctrine
of sovereign immunity."), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982).
25. See supra note 14.
26. See id. See infra text accompanying notes 85-155.
27. See supra text accompanying notes 15-19.
28. See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398; American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S.
347 (1909); Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l City Bank, 353 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 1027 (1966); Victory Transp., 336 F.2d 354; Occidental of Umm Al
Qaywayn, Inc. v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 396 F. Supp. 461 (W.D. La. 1975), aff'd on other
grounds sub norn. Occidental of Umm Al Qaywayn, Inc. v. A Certain Cargo of Petroleum,
577 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 928 (1979); American Hawaiian
Ventures, Inc. v. M.V.J. Latuharhary, 257 F. Supp. 622 (D.N.J. 1966); Eastern States
Petroleum Co. v. Asiatic Petroleum Corp., 28 F. Supp. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1939). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 41 comment
d (1965).
29. See International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. OPEC, 649 F.2d
1354, 1357 n.6 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982); Victory TrarLsT., 336 F.2d
at 359.
30. Victory Transp., 336 F.2d at 359.
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the nature of the act test turns upon whether the act is ordinarily
performed by private parties or by governments. 31 Even under this
test, however, nationalizations generally were understood to be acts
uniquely governmental in nature since they involved formal legislative or executive action effecting the transfer by law of private
property to public hands.
A third approach to the distinction between sovereign and
commercial (or private) acts prior to the FSIA was established by
the Second Circuit in Victory Transport Inc. v. ComisariaGeneral
de Abastecimientos y Transportes.32 In Victory Transport, the court
criticized both of the foregoing tests and decided to formulate its
own by listing five categories of sovereign acts. 33 The second category was "legislative acts, such as nationalization." 34
Most of the cases which applied the traditional view of nationalization involved the act of state doctrine, rather than sovereign
immunity, because prior to the FSIA the courts were not usually
confronted with a suit directly against a foreign state based on a
nationalization. 3 5 The most important of those cases was Banco
Nacionalde Cuba v. Sabbatino,3" in which an agency of the Cuban
government sought to recover the proceeds of the sale of a cargo of
sugar nationalized by the Cuban government. 37 After confirming
31. Id. For example, the purchase of supplies for an army would be considered commercial even though the purchase clearly had a public purpose. See I. BBOWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 330-32 (3d ed. 1979); Weiss, Compdtence ou Incompftence des
Tribunaux 6 l'9gard des tats Ktrangers, 1 RECUEIL DES Cous 525 (1923). Of course, before
applying this test, it is necessary to identify the act at issue. See infra text accompanying notes
46-61. It is true that private parties ordinarily purchase supplies, but not for an army. A

finding of commercial activity results only after the act at issue is identified as purchasing,
without reference to the purpose of the purchase.

32. 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965).
33. Id. at 360.
34. Id. The other four categories listed by the court were: internal administrative acts;
acts concerning the armed forces; acts concerning diplomatic activity; and public loans. Id.
The first two categories, internal administrative acts and legislative acts, would normally
constitute sovereign activity under the nature of the act test. That test, however, could lead to
the opposite conclusion in the case of many acts concerning the armed forces or diplomatic
activity, such as purchasing supplies for the army or renting a building for an embassy. Public
loans would also constitute acts jure gestionis under the nature of the act test. Since the court
in Victory Transport assumed that any acts related to the armed forces or diplomatic activity,
as well as public loans, were sufficiently within the sovereign domain to be protected from
judicial scrutiny, it was necessary for the court to devise its own method for distinguishing
between acts jure imperii and acts jure gestionis.
35. See cases cited supra note 28.
36. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
37. Id. at 400-08.
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that the act of state doctrine applied to the "public" acts of a foreign
sovereign 3 the Court held the doctrine controlling even though the

nationalization had been found by the Second Circuit to be in
violation of customary international law.30 In reaching that decision, the focus of the Court's discussion was on the lack of consensus
in international law concerning the power of a state to expropriate
the property of aliens 40 and the impropriety of judicial review of
such actions "in the absence of a treaty or other unambiguous
agreement regarding controlling legal principles."' 4' The status of
42
the expropriation as a purely public act was never in issue.
Prior to the FSIA and Dunhill, the results in cases involving
nationalizations were thus fairly predictable. If a foreign state were
sued based on a nationalization, it would be accorded immunity; if
the state were not a defendant but the suit nevertheless challenged
the validity of the nationalization, the act of state doctrine would
be applied. Exceptions to these rules existed, but they were not

38. Id. at 401.
39. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'd on other
grounds, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
40. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428-37. Justice Harlan observed that "[t]here are few if any
issues in international law today on which opinion seems to be so divided as the limitations on
a state's power to expropriate the property of aliens." Id. at 428 (footnote omitted).
41. Id.
42. As a reaction to the Sabbatino decision, Congress enacted the Hickenlooper Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1976), which directs:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court in the United States shall
decline on the ground of the federal act of state doctrine to make a determination on
the merits giving effect to the principles of international law in a case in which a
claim of title or other right to property is asserted by any party including a foreign
state (or a party claiming through such state) based upon (or traced through) a
confiscation or other taking after January 1, 1959, by an act of that state in violation
of the principles of international law, including the principles of compensation and
the other standards set out in this subsection; Provided, That this subparagraph
shall not be applicable (1) in any case in which an act of a foreign state is not
contrary to international law or with respect to a claim of title or other right to
property acquired pursuant to an irrevocable letter of credit of not more than 180
days duration issued in good faith prior to the time of the confiscation or other
taking, or (2) in any case with respect to which the President determines that
application of the act of state doctrine is required in that particular case by the
foreign policy interests of the United States and a suggestion to this effect is filed on
his behalf in that case with the court.
Id. Subsequently, in the FSIA, Congress enacted a similar exception to the jurisdictional
immunity of foreign states. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (1976). See inJra note 61.
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based on any connection between nationalization and the concept
of commercial activity. 43
III.

THE CHARACTER OF NATIONALIZATIONS
UNDER THE FSIA AND DUNHILL

The definition of "commercial activity" in the FSIA, 44 the
commercial activity exception to immunity in the FSIA, 45 and
Dunhill have given rise to various theories of nationalization as a
commercial act, or an act in connection with a commercial activity,
for purposes of the FSIA and the act of state doctrine.
As noted above, Congress not only codified the restrictive
theory of sovereign immunity in the FSIA but also adopted the
"nature of the act" test for determining commercial activity. 4 Section 1603(d) of the FSIA provides: "A 'commercial activity' means
either a regular course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act. The commercial character of an activity
shall be determined by reference to the nature of the course of
conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to
its purpose. ' 47 This relatively simple definition goes a long way
toward clarifying the scope of the commercial activity exception to
immunity contained in section 1605(a)(2). 46 It falls short, however,
of providing a mechanical, definitive answer to all fact patterns;

43. Even under the absolute theory of sovereign immunity, it was possible for a state to
waive its immunity. See, e.g., Dexter & Carpenter, Inc. v. Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen, 43
F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 896 (1931). With respect to the act of state
doctrine, several exceptions (in addition to the statutory exception set out in note 42) which
were not dependent upon a finding of commercial activity had been developed by the courts.
See, e.g., Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428 (doctrine might not apply where there is a "treaty or
other unambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal principles"); United Bank Ltd. v.
Cosmic Int'l, Inc., 542 F.2d 868 (2d Cir. 1976) (doctrine does not apply to taking of property
situated outside the territory of the acting state). In some cases, particularly those involving a
contractual or similar relationship between the plaintiff and the state entity, the extraterritoriality exception has been raised in tandem with the Dunhill "commercial activity" exception. See, e.g., Libra Bank Ltd. v. Banco Nacional de Costa Rica, S.A., No. 81 Civ. 7624,
slip op. at 26 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 21, 1983) (since extraterritoriality exception was held applicable, it was unnecessary to "reach the issue of whether this case falls within the commercial
activity exception to the doctrine, if such an exception exists").
44. See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1976).
45. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1976).
46. See supra text accompanying notes 11-14, 31.
47. 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1976).
48. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1976).
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indeed, it was never intended to do so. As stated in the section-bysection analysis of the FSIA incorporated in the House Report (the
section-by-section analysis): "It has seemed unwise to attempt an
excessively precise definition of this term, even if that were practi49
cable."
During the Congressional hearings on the draft legislation, the
following explanation of section 1603(d) was given:
[T]he courts would inquire whether the activity in question is
one which private parties ordinarily perform or whether it is
peculiarly within the realm of governments.
• . . [A]side from mentioning that it should be not based on
the purpose for which the activity occurred, but rather on its
nature, we have decided to put our faith in the U.S. courts to
work out progressively, on a case-by-case basis, and using such
guidance as has already developed in the very large body of case
law which exists, on the distinction between commercial and
governmental .50
This legislative history supports the traditional characterization of
an executive or legislative act of nationalization as a sovereign act.
By definition, private parties are incapable of taking that kind of
measure. Moreover, the large body of pre-FSIA case law unanimously affirms the sovereign character of nationalizations.5 1
Nevertheless, a serious question is raised under the "nature of
the act" test in section 1603(d), particularly in light of Dunhill,
regarding the extent to which the character of a nationalization
may be tainted by an underlying direct relationship between the
state and the person whose assets are nationalized. 5 2 A hypothetical
case illustrates the problem. Assume that the government of country X passes a law nationalizing its mining industry. Under the
constitution of X, all minerals in the ground are the property of the

49. House REPORT, supra note 7, at 16.
50. Jurisdiction of U.S. Courts in Suits Against Foreign States: Hearings on H.R. 11315
Before the Subcom. on Admin. Law and Governmental Relations of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 53 (1976) (statement of Monroe Leigh, Legal Adviser,
Dep't of State).
51. See supra note 28.
52. See Von Mehren, The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 17 COLUM. J.
TBANSNAT'L L. 33, 57-58 (1978).
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state and can only be exploited through concessions granted by the
state. X had granted concessions to various foreign companies,
including Y, a United States company. Among the assets nationalized are the mining concessions and physical assets of those companies. Y brings an action in the United States for compensation for
the nationalization, asserting jurisdiction by reason of section
1605(a) (2) of the FSIA. Y's theory proceeds as follows: its concession
constituted a contract with X; the nationalization of the concession
constituted a breach of that contract; a breach of contract is the
type of act that private parties ordinarily perform and is therefore
commercial in nature. If sufficient contacts with the United States
53
are shown, is X's immunity removed by section 1605(a)(2)?
The key to answering such questions and applying the "nature
of the act" test in section 1603(d) is identification and definition of
the particular act at issue in the suit, which can often be a difficult
task. A case not involving nationalizations that illustrates the difficulty in these situations is InternationalAssociation of Machinists &
Aerospace Workers v. OPEC.54 In that case, plaintiff asserted antitrust claims against the member states of OPEC, basing jurisdiction
on section 1605(a)(2) of the FSIA. The court was thus faced with
the issue whether the OPEC states' actions were sovereign or commercial in nature. According to the plaintiffs analysis, the challenged conduct was simply price-fixing by sellers of oil. 55 Standing
alone, that description of the states' activity could lead readily to a
finding of commercial activity since private companies can and
often do engage in commercial price-fixing activities. The court,
however, characterized the same actions as the establishment by
sovereign nations of the terms and conditions for the removal of

53. The issue of jurisdictional contacts required by section 1605(a)(2) is beyond the
scope of this Article. See Ministry of Supply, Cairo v. Universe Tankships, Inc., 708 F.2d 80
(2d Cir. 1983); Maritime Int'l Nominees Establishments v. Republic of Guinea, 693 F.2d
1094 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 52 U.S.L.W. 3262 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1983) (No. 82-1754);
Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Rep. of Nig., 647 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982); Thos. P. Gonzalez Corp. v. Consejo Nacional de Produccion
de Costa Rica, 614 F.2d 1247 (9th Cir. 1980).
54. 477 F. Supp. 553 (C.D. Cal. 1979), aff'd on other grounds, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982).
55. Id. at 558-59.
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vital natural resources from their respective territories. 5 From this
5
perspective, the activity appeared governmental in nature. 1
The same type of analysis may be undertaken with respect to
the hypothetical facts set forth above. 58 Is the act at issue no more
than a repudiation of a purely commercial obligation, or is it more
like a traditional exercise of a state's legislative powers to transfer
private assets within its territory to governmental hands? The balance would seem to be tipped in favor of the latter approach. As a
matter of form, state X has acted in a governmental capacity by
exercising its legislative powers. As a matter of substance, the case
does not involve a mere attempt to cloak a purely commercial act in
a mantle of sovereignty by attaching the label of nationalization to
it. Rather, it is the assumption by X of control over the conduct of a
business within its borders and the taking of all assets, tangible and
intangible, necessary to accomplish that result. 5 Depending on the
circumstances surrounding the nationalization, issues may be raised
regarding its legality under international law. 60 Those issues, how-

56. Id. at 567.
57. Id. at 568. On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the dismissal on the basis of the
act of state doctrine, which it viewed as more flexible than sovereign immunity. International
Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982). The act of state doctrine is designed to assist the courts in
avoiding adjudication of politically sensitive areas. In this respect, it may be applicable even
in cases involving a "commercial component." Id. at 1360. According to the Ninth Circuit:
"While purely commercial activity may not rise to the level of an act of state, certain
seemingly commercial activity will trigger act of state considerations." Id. (footnote omitted). Since the OPEC states had exercised their sovereignty in a highly sensitive area of
international law and foreign relations, their actions were not considered "purely commercial" within the meaning of Dunhill and therefore qualified as acts of state.
58. See supra text accompanying note 53.
59. See Eskridge, The Iranian Nationalization Cases: Toward a General Theory of
Jurisdictionover Foreign States, 22 HARv. INT'L L.J. 525, 580-81 (1981).
60. See Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. Jaffrate, [1953] 1 W.L.R. 246, 20 I.L.R. 316 (Sup. Ct.
Aden 1953); Judgment of Sept. 13, 1954, Corte cass., Italy, 1955 Foro It. 1 256, 22 I.L.R. 23;
Judgment of May 27, 1953, District Ct., Tokyo, 20 I.L.R. 305, appeal dismissed, Judgment
of Sept. 11, 1953, High Ct., Tokyo, 6 K~sai Minshfi 702, 20 I.L.R. 312; American Indep. Oil
Co. v. Government of Kuwait, 21 I.L.M. 976 (1982); I. BROWNLIE, supra note 31, at 518-51;
8 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTEaNATIONAL LAW 1020-85 (1967); Carlston, Concession
Agreements and Nationalization,52 AM. J. INT'L L. 260 (1958); Domke, Indonesian Nationalization Measures Bejore Foreign Courts, 54 AM. J. INT'L L. 305 (1960); Seidl-Hohenveldern, Chilean Copper Nationalization Cases Bejore German Courts, 69 AM. J. INT'L L.
110 (1975).
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ever, do not relate to the character of the nationalization as a
sovereign act."'
Dunhill is consistent with the foregoing analysis. In holding
that the repudiation by commercial agents (interventors) of the
Cuban government to repay monies unjustly received in the course
of business was not an act of state, the majority stressed that "[n]o
statute, decree, order, or resolution of the Cuban Government itself
was offered in evidence indicating that Cuba had repudiated its
obligations in general or any class thereof or that it had as a
sovereign matter determined to confiscate the amounts due three
foreign importers." '6 2 The Dunhill majority rested its decision on an
evidentiary point.6 3 An act cannot be a "sovereign" and "public"
act (i.e., an act of state) unless it is performed in the exercise of the
state's sovereign authority. Since it had not been proved that the
interventors were exercising such authority, no act of state existed.
In part III of his opinion, Justice White, expressing the views
of only four justices, went further than the limited evidentiary
holding described above and argued that the act of state doctrine
would not apply even if Cuba had purported to exercise its sovereign authority to repudiate the commercial debts. 4 He considered
such a result consistent with the restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity, under which a foreign state could be subjected to suit
based on its purely commercial activities. Any other conclusion

61. The legality of a taking under international law is relevant to the Hickenlooper
Amendment, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1976), the statutory exception to the act of state
doctrine enacted following the decision in Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398. See supra note 42. It also
is relevant to the expropriation exception to immunity contained in section 1605(a)(3) of the
FSIA. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (1976). Section 1605(a)(3), which is the jurisdictional counterpart to the Hickenlooper Amendment, provides that a foreign state will not enjoy immunity
from jurisdiction in cases
in which rights in property taken in violation of international law are in issue and
that property or any property exchanged for such property is present in the United
States in connection with a commercial activity carried on in the United States by
the foreign state; or that property or any property exchanged for such property is
owned or operated by an agency or instrumentality of the foreign state and that
agency or instrumentality is engaged in a commercial activity in the United States.
Id. See HOUSE REoRT, supra note 7, at 19-20.
62. Alfred Dunhill, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 695 (1976).
63. See Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1, 265-75 (1976).
64. Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 695. Justice Stevens did not concur in this part of the opinion.
Id. at 684.
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might eviscerate the restrictive theory, since a foreign sovereign
could always exercise its sovereign authority to repudiate its commercial debts, whether before or after suit.65
The intended scope of Justice White's opinion is not entirely
clear. However, in relying heavily on the development of the restrictive theory in the United States since 1952, it does not seem
likely that he had in mind the concept of nationalization as a
commercial act. On the contrary, after referring to the principle
that "[t]he greater the degree of codification or consensus concerning a particular area of international law, the more appropriate it is
for the judiciary to render decisions regarding it,""" he stated:
"There may be little codification or consensus as to the rules of
international law concerning exercises of governmental powers,
including military powers and expropriations, within a sovereign
state's borders affecting the property or persons of aliens." 7
Thus, neither the holding in Dunhill nor part III of Justice
White's opinion alters the pre-FSIA view of nationalizatio.
Dunhill indicates that acts of commercial agents of a state will not
ordinarily be elevated to the status of acts of state. It also indicates
that the courts are less likely to presume sovereign activity where
the act is performed in the course of a purely commercial business
and affects the commercial obligations of the state. But where a
government formally does exercise its sovereign authority and acts
qua government, its actions remain sovereign in nature under both
the FSIA and Dunhill.

65. Id. at 698-99. See Leigh & Sandier, Dunhill: Toward a Reconsideration of Sabbatino, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 685 (1976).
66. Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 704 (quoting Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428).
67. Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 704 (latter emphasis added). See supra note 40. In considering
Justice White's reference to international law, it is worth noting that substantial international
authority exists in support of the sovereign character of nationalizations, particularly those
relating to natural resources. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 50,
U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974); G.A. Res. 3016, 27 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30) at 48, U.N. Doc.
A/8730 (1972); G.A. Res. 2158, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 29, U.N. Doc. A/6316
(1966); G.A. Res. 1803, 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 17) at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962)
(resolutions of U.N. General Assembly regarding permanent sovereignty over natural resources). See also Joint Report of Officials Appointed to Determine Paymentfor Expropriated
Mexican Petroleum Property (Apr. 17, 1942), reprinted in 9 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1776-1949, at 1153 (C. Bevans ed.
1972) ("Expropriation, and the exercise of the right of eminent domain, under the respective
Constitutions and Laws of Mexico and the United States, are a recognized feature of the
sovereignty of all modern States."). Such international authority has been cited by United
States courts in determining sovereign immunity issues under the FSIA. See Texas Trading &
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Although the commercial activity issue seems analytically most
difficult when some form of direct relationship exists between the
nationalized party and the state, it has frequently been raised in
another context relating to nationalization. It has been argued that
nationalization is an act "in connection with" a commercial activity
when the state utilizes the nationalized assets to engage in a business
subsequent to the taking."8 The "in connection with" theory is
based primarily on the third clause of the FSIA's commercial activity exception to immunity.6 9 That provision denies immunity to a
foreign state when the action is based on "an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity
of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in
the United States." ' 70 Because of the wording of the clause, particularly the phrase "in connection with a commercial activity," the
question arises whether the "act" which is "in connection with" the
"commercial activity" must itself be purely commercial, or whether
the character of an act otherwise sovereign in nature is sufficiently
affected by its relationship to a broader commercial activity as to be
transformed into a commercial act.
7
Once again, the hypothetical fact pattern utilized earlier 1
illustrates the problem. Assume that country X, upon nationalizing
the mining industry, transfers the nationalized assets to a state
corporation for purposes of commercial operation. Company Y
brings suit against X in the United States. It claims that the nationalization was the essential first step, and therefore an inextricable
part, of X's entry into the commercial business of producing and

Milling Corp. v. Federal Rep. of Nig., 647 F.2d 300, 310 (2d Cir. 1981) ("current standards
of international law concerning sovereign immunity add content to the 'commercial activity'
phrase of the FSIA"), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982); International Ass'n of Machinists &
Aerospace Workers v. OPEC, 477 F. Supp. 553 (C.D. Cal. 1979) (citing United Nations
resolutions relating to sovereignty over natural resources), aff'd on other grounds, 649 F.2d
1354 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982).
68. See infra text accompanying notes 85-156. The definition of "commercial activity"
in 28 U.S.C. § 1603(d) (1976) covers both individual transactions or acts and "a regular
course of commercial conduct." According to the section-by-section analysis: "A 'regular
course of commercial conduct' includes the carrying on of a commercial enterprise such as a
mineral extraction company, an airline or a state trading corporation." HousE REP'owr, supra
note 7, at 16.
69. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1976).
70. Id.
71. See supra text accompanying note 53.
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marketing its natural resources, and that the nationalization had a
direct effect on an American company in the United States. Does
section 1605(a)(2) bar X's claim for immunity?
The legislative history relating specifically to section 1605(a) (2)
does not support this theory. 72 Nowhere in that legislative history is
there any indication that the "act" which must be "in connection
with" a commercial activity need not be a commercial or private
act; nor is there support for the proposition that subsequent commercial operation of a nationalized business satisfies the "in connec73
tion with" requirement.
The section-by-section analysis does not provide direct assistance for the interpretation of the third clause of section
1605(a)(2). 74 It merely states that the provision contemplates the
exercise of jurisdiction consistent with the standards set forth in
section 18 of the Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations
Law of the United States. 75 That section, however, is more concerned with the jurisdictional reach of United States legislation
76
than the nature of the conduct covered.
Indirect assistance is provided by the legislative history of the
second clause of section 1605(a)(2), 77 which denies immunity in
suits based on "an act performed in the United States in connection
with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere. ' 78 The
"in connection with" construction of the second and third clauses is
identical; the only difference between the clauses is the requirement
in the second clause that the act upon which the suit is based be
performed in the United States rather than abroad. 79 The sectionby-section analysis states that the second clause is designed to cover
the case in which "a claim arises out of a specific act in the United
States which is commercial or private in nature and which relates to
a commercial activity abroad."' 0 Thus, the second clause does not
contemplate the exercise of jurisdiction in suits based on sovereign

72. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 18-19.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 19.
76. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN
§ 18 (1965).
77. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 7, at 19.
78. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1976).
79. HOUSE RESoRT, supra note 7, at 19.
80. Id. (emphasis added).

RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
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acts by virtue of some perceived connection with commercial activity. The same interpretation would logically apply to the third
clause.
More generally, in analyzing the "in connection with" theory
of commercial activity, it is important again to recall that the
primary purpose of the FSIA was the codification of the restrictive
theory of sovereign immunity.8 In this respect, the statute was not
seen as a radical departure from prior law.8 2 In enacting section
1605(a)(2), Congress intended to make clear that a foreign state
could be subjected to suit if it -engaged in commercial activity
having the requisite jurisdictional nexus with the United States; it
did not intend to abrogate the traditional immunity accorded a
foreign state when it acted as a sovereign. To place nationalization
under the umbrella of section 1605(a)(2) on the theory that it is an
act in connection with a commercial activity would not seem consistent with this legislative intent. Many nationalizations have been
undertaken as a prelude to commercial operation of the nationalized businesses by the foreign states concerned or their state corporations.8 3 There have been cases in which property has been taken
by a foreign state for use in non-commercial activities, such as
military activity.8 4 However, the pattern typified by the hypothetical case described above is the rule, rather than the exception. If
Congress had wished to reverse the large body of case law existing
on the subject, a more clearly expressed intent to do so would have
been warranted.
IV.

CASE DEVELOPMENT

With some exceptions, the case law to date supports the above
analysis. The first important post-Dunhillcase involving a nationalization was D'Angelo v. Petroleos Mexicanos.8 5 In that case, a
holder of royalty and participation interests in nationalized concessions sought compensation for the nationalization. Having obtained

81. Id. at 7. See supra note 13.
82. See supra text accompanying notes 46-51.
83. See infra text accompanying notes 85-156.
84. See, e.g., Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918) (military use);
Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf & W. Indus., 473 F. Supp. 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1979)
(creation of national park).
85. 422 F. Supp. 1280 (D. Del. 1976), aff'd, 564 F.2d 89 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1035 (1978).
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86
jurisdiction by attachment prior to the enactment of the FSIA,
plaintiff argued that Dunhill rendered the act of state doctrine
inapplicable because the Mexican government had transferred the
nationalized assets to its decentralized agency, Petroleos Mexicanos,
for commercial operations.
In analyzing plaintiff's Dunhill argument, the court first
pointed out that the majority opinion in Dunhill was based only on
the absence of any evidence that the repudiation of Dunhill's claim
was an official act of the Cuban government.8 7 The existence of a
formal expropriation decree in D'Angelo, 'supported by an official
declaration of the Mexican government, distinguished D'Angelo
from Dunhill. Nevertheless, the court also considered part III of
Justice White's opinion in Dunhill as well as plaintiff's argument
that since Petroleos Mexicanos was engaged in a commercial business, the act of state doctrine had no relevance. In this connection,
the court clearly distinguished between the expropriation and the
subsequent commercial activity:

The fact that the Mexican government ultimately entered the oil
business through Pemex does not make the expropriation itself
commercial activity. It is a classic example of the exercise of a
governmental power as an act of the sovereign. For this reason
the opinion of Mr. Justice White and the three justices joining
him in Dunhill, relating as the opinion does to governmental
action in a commercial area, can have no relevance to the
present case. 88
A series of cases involving Libyan nationalizations is consistent
with D'Angelo on the commercial activity issue. In Hunt v. Mobil
Oil Corp.,81 plaintiff asserted antitrust claims against several oil

86. Prior to the FSIA, the issues of sovereign immunity and jurisdiction were not linked.
Kahale & Vega, supra note 11, at 213-14. Jurisdiction over the foreign state was often
obtained by attachment. HousE REPOT, supra note 7, at 8; Griffin, Adjective Law and
Practice in Suits Against Foreign Governments, 36 TEMP. L.Q. 1 (1982). Subject matter
jurisdiction in the federal courts was usually based on the diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332
(1976). After acquiring jurisdiction, the court would decide, if requested, whether to decline
to exercise its jurisdiction by reason of the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The foreign state
defendant also had the option of petitioning the State Department for a suggestion of
immunity. See supra notes 11-12, 14.
87. D'Angelo v. Petroleos Mexicanos, 422 F. Supp. 1280, 1286 (D. Del. 1976), af'd, 564
F.2d 89 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1035 (1978).
88. Id.
89. 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977).
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companies, alleging that they had induced the nationalization of
plaintiff's oil concession interests and related assets. Sovereign immunity was not in issue since the foreign state was not named as a
defendant in the case. However, the act of state doctrine was
applied to that part of plaintiff's claim which involved an inquiry
into the motives of the state in enacting the nationalization.0
In its act of state discussion, the Second Circuit in Hunt, like
the court in D'Angelo, focused on Dunhill and its ramifications. '
Dunhill was construed as simply a reaffirmation of the act of state
doctrine "in traditional terms," meaning that the doctrine applied
to "public" acts of a sovereign acting in the exercise of "governmental" authority.9 2 Similarly, Dunhill was seen as confirming the prior
law relating to nationalization. Describing the character of the
nationalization before it in light of Dunhill, the court stated: "Expropriations of the property of an alien within the boundaries of the
sovereign state are traditionally considered to be public acts of the
sovereign . . . .Indeed such action as that taken here by Libya is
cited in Dunhill as an example of non-commercial sovereign activity .... .93
Significantly, the Second Circuit overlooked the distinction in
Dunhill between the majority opinion and part III of Justice
White's opinion.9 4 It referred to part III, from which it was quoting, as the "majority opinion." ' 15 Thus, the act of state holding in

90. Plaintiff attempted to avoid application of the act of state doctrine by stressing that
no challenge to the validity of the nationalization was being made. The court ruled that an
inquiry into the motives of a state in performing an act necessarily entails an inquiry into the
validity of the act. Since plaintiff's claim required analysis of the state's motives in order to
determine whether the nationalization was the product of defendants' alleged conspiracy, the
claim was held barred by the act of state doctrine. Mobil Oil, 550 F.2d at 75-77. Accord
General Aircraft Corp. v. Air Am., Inc., 482 F. Supp. 3 (D.D.C. 1979). But see Williams v.
Curtiss-Wright Corp., 694 F.2d 300, 304 (3d Cir. 1982) (doctrine does not necessarily
preclude inquiry into state motivation; Hunt is distinguishable because "claims based on
expropriation are traditionally barred by the act of state doctrine"); Industrial Inv. Dev.
Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 594 F.2d 48, 54-55 (5th Cir. 1979) ("we disagree that motivation and
validity are equally protected by the act of state rubric").
91. Mobil Oil, 550 F.2d at 72-73.
92. Id. at 73.
93. Id. Cf. United Mex. States v. Ashley, 556 S.W.2d 784, 786 (Tex. 1977) (Dunhill
cited for proposition that land expropriation is "governmental action and not a commercial
activity within the scope of the doctrine of restrictive sovereign immunity.").
94. See Dominicus Americana Bohio v. Gulf & W. Indus., 473 F. Supp. 680 (S.D.N.Y.
1979); Bokkelen v. Grumman Aerospace Corp., 432 F. Supp. 329 (E.D.N.Y.1977).
95. Mobil Oil, 550 F.2d at 73.
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Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp. apparently was not based merely on the
fact that the nationalization was embodied in a formal decree.
Rather, the Second Circuit seemed to reach beyond the authority
supporting the nationalization and rely on the character of the
action taken. Not only had the state exercised its sovereign authority, it had done so to perform a sovereign and public act. The latter
point was established by case precedent and was reinforced by
political circumstances surrounding the nationalization as interpreted by the Second Circuit.96
Hunt v. Coastal States Gas ProducingCo.97 involved the same
nationalization decree as Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp. In Coastal
States, plaintiff attempted to recover for conversion from the purchaser of oil. The oil had been produced by a Libyan state entity
from the area covered by the nationalized concession. Since the
success of the conversion action depended on proof that the title of
Coastal States' transferor was not good, the validity of the nationalization was called into question.
Relying heavily on part III of Justice White's opinion in
Dunhill, the plaintiff in Coastal States contended that "when a
foreign government engages in a 'commercial' activity, such as
Libya's conduct with regard to the Sarir field, the Act of State
Doctrine does not apply and a court can inquire into the validity of
the nationalization decree."'9 8 As in D'Angelo v. Petroleos Mexicanos,99 the court rejected this contention on two levels. It first observed that the language of Dunhill invoked by plaintiff was not
part of the majority opinion in that case.10 0 However, despite the
fact that the formal nationalization decree involved in Coastal
States presumably satisfied the evidentiary requirements of the
Dunhill majority,' 0 l the court also stated: "But, in any event, when

96. Id. The court viewed the nationalization as a "political" act and part of "a continuing and broadened confrontation between the East and West in an oil crisis which has
implications and complications far transcending those suggested by appellants." Id. at 73, 78.
These circumstances removed "[alny possible doubt" as to the sovereign nature of the act at
issue. Id. at 73.
97. 570 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978), aff'd, 583 S.W.2d 322 (Tex.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 992, reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 1103 (1979).
98. Id. at 508.
99. 422 F. Supp. 1280 (D. Del. 1976), afJ'd, 564 F.2d 89 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1035 (1978). See supra text accompanying notes 85-88.
100. Coastal States, 570 S.W.2d at 508.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 62-63.
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a foreign state has exercised a sovereign power, as Libya did here, it
10 2
is a governmental, and not a commercial, act."
The first major case concerning nationalization in the context
of the FSIA was Carey v. National Oil Corp., 1 3 which involved
another Libyan oil nationalization and a transfer of the nationalized interests to a state corporation. Neither of the plaintiffs was
itself nationalized. They claimed, however, that the nationalization
interrupted a supply contract between one of the plaintiffs and an
affiliate of a company whose interests were nationalized, thereby
causing damage to plaintiffs. Jurisdiction was alleged to exist under
the third clause of the commercial activity exception to immu104
nity.
Plaintiffs in Carey argued that the nationalization was "simply
the first step" in establishing an "integrated oil business."105 As
such, the nationalization was arguably an act "in connection with"
a commercial activity. In this regard, plaintiffs distinguished between a nationalization carried out for military or other non-commercial purposes, such as conservation, and one followed immediately by commercial operation of the nationalized interests either
by the state itself or by a state-owned company.106
The district court in Carey rejected these arguments without
much elaboration, stating that "nationalization is the quintessentially sovereign act, never viewed as having a commercial character.' 0 7 Earlier in its opinion, the court had stated with respect to
other claims made by plaintiffs: 108 "The structure of the Foreign

102. Coastal States, 570 S.W.2d at 508.
103. 453 F. Supp. 1097 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), a~f'd on other grounds, 592 F.2d 673 (2d Cir.
1979).
104. Id. at 1101. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (1976).
105. Plaintiffs' Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at
34, Carey.
106. See supra note 84. While the district court did not discuss the point, a basic
problem with plaintiffs' analysis was its focus on the "purpose" of the nationalization. The
definition of "commercial activity" in section 1603(d) specifically provides that the "purpose"
of an act is not the determining factor in the commercial activity analysis. 28 U.S.C. §
1603(d) (1976). See supra text accompanying notes 46-51.
107. Carey, 453 F. Supp. at 1102. On appeal, the Second Circuit did not reach the
commercial activity issue. It affirmed the district court's holding on the ground that no
"direct effect" in the United States had been shown. Carey v. National Oil Corp., 592 F.2d
673, 676-77 (2d Cir. 1979).
108. The claim for damages resulting from the nationalization was one of eight claims
asserted by plaintiffs. Two other claims, which were based on the 1973 oil embargo, were
also held by the district court to be based on sovereign activity. Carey, 453 F. Supp. at 1102.
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Sovereign Immunities Act leaves no question that non-commercial
activities of a foreign state will be treated with the same deference
to which they were entitled before 1976." 109 In a footnote, the court
observed that section 1605(a)(3), the expropriation exception to
immunity,"l0 was the one exception to that principle. IIIThat provision was inapplicable for various reasons and was not argued by
2
plaintiffs."
Libyan American Oil Co. v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab
Jamahiriyall 3 also involved a Libyan nationalization of physical
assets and concession interests and a transfer of the nationalized
assets to a state corporation. The fact pattern, however, was different in other respects from both the Hunt cases and Carey. Unlike
the Hunt cases, the foreign state was the defendant; unlike Carey,
the plaintiff was the party whose interests were nationalized. In
addition, Libyan American Oil Company had obtained an arbitral
award in default proceedings conducted in Switzerland under the
arbitration clause in the nationalized concessions. The action in the
United States was brought as a petition for confirmation of the
award. "14
The petitioner in Libyan American Oil Co. asserted that jurisdiction existed by reason of each of the first three immunity exceptions in the FSIA: the waiver, commercial activity and expropriation exceptions." 5 With respect to the commercial activity
provision, it claimed that the nationalization was no more than a
109. Id. Accord Frolova v. USSR, 558 F. Supp. 358, 362-63 (N.D. Ill. 1983) ("The Act
specifically retained sovereign immunity for the foreign state's public acts.").
110. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (1976).
111. Carey, 453 F. Supp. at 1102 n.4.
112. Since plaintiffs' interest had not been nationalized, they could not allege that rights
in property taken in violation of international law were in issue; nor did they allege the
jurisdictional nexus with the United States required by section 1605(a)(3). Similarly, plaintiffs were not able to allege facts which would fit their claims within the Hickenlooper
Amendment, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1976). See supra note 42. Thus, plaintiffs attempted to
fit their case within the commercial activity exception to immunity and Dunhill.
113. 482 F. Supp. 1175 (D.D.C. 1980). The dispute in Libyan American Oil Co. was
settled during the pendency of cross-appeals from the district court's decision. On May 6,
1981, the court of appeals granted an unopposed motion, made by several parties that had
appeared on appeal as amici curiae, for an order vacating the district court's opinion for
mootness.
114. 482 F. Supp. at 1176-77. The petition was based on the Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517,
T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38. The United States legislation implementing the Convention is codified at 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1976).
115. 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (a)(1)-(3) (1976).
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breach of contract which was commercial in nature for purposes of
both section 1603(d) of the FSIA and the "commercial activity"
exception to the act of state doctrine. "6 The court held that jurisdiction existed by reason of the waiver exception to immunity and thus
did not reach the applicability of either the commercial activity or
the expropriation exception. " 7 Having found jurisdiction, the court
proceeded to examine the applicability of the act of state doctrine
and, in that connection, did reach the commercial activity issue.'"l
Since it held that the nationalization was a sovereign act, the court
applied the act of state doctrine and dismissed the petition." 9 As
support for its characterization of the nature of the nationalization,
the court found it necessary to cite specifically only Hunt v. Mobil
Oil Corp. 20 However, it also stated that "[s]ince the ruling in
of
Underhill, courts have consistently found a foreign state's act
2
nationalization to be the classic example of an act of state."' 1
The cases discussed above involving nationalizations were
marked by a consistency of result which matched the pre-FSIA and
Dunhill period. In contrast with the earlier period, however, the
courts were following a more difficult path to the ultimate decision.
Commercial activity arguments based on the FSIA and Dunhill
were briefed and argued, requiring the courts to address sophisticated issues of statutory construction and case interpretation that
previously had not been relevant. With these new issues frequently
presented, the distinct possibility existed that a court might be
persuaded to apply the "commercial activity" exception to both

116. Memorandum of Libyan American Oil Co. in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss and
in Support of Petition to Confirm Arbitral Award at 31-42, Libyan Am. Oil Co.
117. Libyan Am. Oil Co., 482 F. Supp. at 1178.
118. Id. at 1178-79.
119. Id. at 1179. Before reaching its conclusion, the court also considered the Hickenlooper Amendment, 22 U.S.C. 2370(e)(2) (1976). See supra note 42. It held the Hickenlooper
Amendment inapplicable because the provision does not apply to the taking of intangible
property, such as concession rights. Libyan Am. Oil Co., 482 F. Supp. at 1179. See Occidental of Umm Al Qaywayn, Inc. v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 396 F. Supp. 461 (W.D. La. 1975),
aff'd on other grounds sub nom., Occidental of Umm Al Qaywayn, Inc. v. A Certain Cargo
of Petroleum, 577 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 928 (1979); Coastal
States, 583 S.W.2d 322.
120. Libyan Am. Oil Co., 482 F. Supp. at 1179. See supra text accompanying notes 8996.
121. Libyan Am. Oil Co., 482 F. Supp. at 1179.
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sovereign immunity and the act of state doctrine in a nationalization case. The occasion arose in litigation stemming from nationalizations by the government of Iran.
In two decisions arising out of the Iranian crisis, American
InternationalGroup, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran212 and Pfizer
2 3
Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran,1
the theory of nationalization as
an act "in connection with" a commercial activity appears to have
been accepted. Both cases involved claims for compensation following a nationalization; both involved subsequent commercial operation of the nationalized assets by Iran or a state-owned entity; and
in both jurisdiction was found, at least in part, based on the third
2 4
clause of the commercial activity exception to immunity.1
In American InternationalGroup, Inc. v. Islamic Republic of
Iran,125 plaintiffs sought compensation for the nationalization of
their interests in various Iranian insurance companies. The nationalized interests were subsequently operated by Central Insurance of
Iran, a governmental agency which had been created in 1971 to
carry on and oversee the insurance business in Iran. The court held
that defendants had waived their jurisdictional immunity under
section 1605(a)(1) by virtue of the Treaty of Amity, Economic
Relations, and Consular Rights between the United States of Amer6 It went on to hold, however,
ica and Iran. 11
that the third clause of
127
section 1605(a)(2) also served to deny defendants immunity.
Explaining the commercial activity component of its holding,
the court in American International Group merely stated: "Further, the failure of defendants to provide compensation to plaintiffs, resulting in an increase of the State insurance monopoly from
25 or 50% to 100%, is an act 'in connection with a commercial

122. 493 F. Supp. 522 (D.D.C. 1980), vacated on other grounds, 657 F.2d 430 (D.C.
Cir. 1981).
123. No. 80 Civ. 2791 (D.D.C. Nov. 26, 1980), vacated on other grounds sub nom.,
American Int'l Group, Inc. v. Islamic Rep. of Iran, 657 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
124. See infra text accompanying notes 125-32.
125. 493 F. Supp. 522 (D.D.C. 1980), vacated on other grounds, 657 F.2d 430 (D.C.
Cir. 1981).
126. Aug. 15, 1975, United States-Iran, 8 U.S.T. 899, T.I.A.S. No. 3853. Cf. Chicago
Bridge & Iron Co. v. Islamic Rep. of Iran, 506 F. Supp. 981 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (waiver
provision in Treaty of Amity, supra, did not constitute a waiver for purposes of section
1605(a)(1)). See Delaume, Foreign Sovereign Immunity: Impact on Arbitration, 38 Ara. J.
34 (1983); Kahale, Arbitration and Choice-of-Law Clauses as Waiver of JurisdictionalImmunity, 14 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 29 (1981).
127. American Intl Group, Inc., 493 F. Supp. at 526.
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activity' within the meaning of Section 1605(a) (2)."128 Presumably,
the "commercial activity" referred to was the operation of the
insurance monopoly.
Pfizer Inc. v. Islamic Republic of Iran12 9 reaches a similar
conclusion as American International Group. In Pfizer, plaintiffs
were two Panamanian companies and their United States parent.
One of the Panamanian plaintiffs held eighty percent of the capital
stock of an Iranian corporation which manufactured and distributed finished products from imported pharmaceutical materials. In
1980, Iran took over the Iranian pharmaceutical company by appointing its sole directors. Plaintiffs sought compensation for their
financial loss, alleging jurisdiction again under the waiver, com30
mercial activity and expropriation exceptions to immunity.
The waiver and expropriation exceptions were not used in
Pfizer.131 The holding was instead based on the commercial activity
provision. As in American International Group, the court did not
engage in an elaborate analysis of the commercial activity requirement of section 1605(a)(2). It also did not explain how the "in
connection with" requirement of the third clause of section
1605(a)(2) was satisfied, stating only: "Defendants do not dispute
that this action is based on the nationalization and expropriation of
Pfizer Laboratories in Iran, an 'act outside the territory of the
United States,' and that Pfizer Laboratories continues to be operated by the Iranian ministries, 'a commercial activity of the foreign
state elsewhere'." 132
In both American International Group and Pfizer, the courts
applied a literal interpretation of the third clause of section
1605(a)(2), coupled with a liberal assumption. They did not analyze the character of the nationalizations, relying instead on the "in
connection with" construction of the statute. Yet, both courts apparently assumed that the continued operation of the nationalized
businesses supplied the necessary link between the nationalizations
and a commercial activity of Iran. No attempt was made by either

128. Id. This reasoning was also relied upon in part by the court in rejecting the act of
state defense under Dunhill. Id. at 525.
129. No. 80 Civ. 2791 (D.D.C. Nov. 26, 1980), vacated on other grounds sub nom.
American Int'l Group, Inc. v. Islamic Rep. of Iran, 657 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
130. Id. at 6-7.
131. Id. at 7.
132. Id.
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court to support that assumption with case authority or legislative
history.
Although the courts in the two Iranian cases may have correctly presumed that the operation of the nationalized businesses
33
was a commercial activity under section 1603(d) of the FSIA,1
there seems to be little justification for presuming that such operation was sufficient to bring the nationalizations within the purview
of section 1605(a)(2).1M The actions were not based in any'way on
the commercial activity identified (insurance and pharmaceutical
operations), but on the nationalizations themselves. The facts of the
cases indicated that the nationalizations were public and governmental acts of the same type involved in the earlier nationalization
cases. Significantly, neither court stated anything which would
contradict that characterization. Given the fact that the actions
were based on sovereign activity, the use of section 1605(a)(2) as a
vehicle for acquiring jurisdiction seems to have been inappro1 35
priate.
The cases decided after American International Group and
Pfizer involving nationalization and the commercial activity issue
have reverted to the prior analysis. In Empresa Cubana Exportadora de Azucar y sus Derivadosv. Lamborn & Co., 13' an agency of
the Cuban government was awarded judgment as seller under a
sugar contract. Lamborn had attempted to assert the Cuban seizure
of the assets of its assignor as a set-off. Since the original action had
been brought by the Cuban agency, sovereign immunity was not
available as a defense.13 7 However, the court held that the counterclaim was barred by the act of state doctrine.138 Distinguishing
Dunhill, it stated:

133. See supra note 68.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 68-84.
135. It has been suggested that the political circumstances surrounding the Iranian cases
distorted the issues in the courtrooms, leading to "bad law." Eskridge, supra note 59, at 589.
The natural tendency of courts and commentators would be to assume that tense political
circumstances surrounding a case increase the likelihood of dismissal of an action against a
foreign state. See International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. OPEC, 649 F.2d
1354 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1163 (1982); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d
68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977). In the Iranian cases, precisely the opposite
may have occurred.
136. 652 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1981).
137. Id. at 238 n.l. See 28 U.S.C. § 1607 (1976).
138. Lamborn, 652 F.2d at 237-39.
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While we read the two principal opinions in Dunhill to agree
that courts should at least be inclined against applying the doctrine when they determine the challenged governmental conduct
to be commercial, there is no indication here that the seizure of
[the assignor's] Havana assets was anything but the governmental action of a sovereign which it purported to be. In contrast to
the clearly commercial dealings of Cubazucar as Cuba's sugar
merchant to the world, the Republic of Cuba's seizure of [the
one
assignor's] assets was not a mercantile transaction but rather 39
designed to respond to labor difficulties of general concern.

The Second Circuit's overall approach to the commercial activity issue in Lamborn is quite similar to its approach in Hunt v.
Mobil Oil Corp.140 Once again, it viewed the majority opinion and

part III of Justice White's opinion in Dunhill as granting a lesser
degree of deference to commercial activities of foreign states. 14' The
court's consideration of the circumstances surrounding the nationalization (the "labor difficulties of general concern"), as well as its
observation that the evidence indicated that the nationalization was
the governmental action "it purported to be," 42 is also reminiscent
of the approach in Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp. 143 The Second Circuit
has made clear that nationalization is normally to be treated as an
exercise of governmental powers within the meaning of Dunhill.
Although a litigant may attempt to rebut that presumption, the
litigant's burden in doing so would be particularly heavy. As indicated by both Hunt and Lamborn, that burden becomes even
heavier when the circumstances surrounding the nationalization
further support its character as a sovereign act rather than an act
performed in the course of a purely commercial operation.

139. Id. at 238. More recently, the Supreme Court permitted Citibank to set off the
value of its assets nationalized by Cuba against a claim under a letter of credit issued by
Citibank in support of a contract for delivery of sugar. First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para el
Comercio Exterior de Cuba, 103 S. Ct. 2591 (1983). The opinion did not turn upon the
character of the nationalization, but on the circumstances under which a claim against a
foreign government may be asserted against a legal entity created by it. Id. See also First
Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972).
140. 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977). See supra text accompanying notes 89-96.
141. Lamborn, 652 F.2d at 238. See supra text accompanying notes 62-67.
142. Lamborn, 652 F.2d at 238.
143. 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977). See supra text accompanying note 96.
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In Ethiopian Spice Extraction Share Co. v. Kalamazoo Spice
Extraction Co.,1 44 the court relied on Lamborn in applying the act
of state doctrine to an Ethiopian nationalization. The Ethiopian
government had nationalized the shares of an Ethiopian corporation (ESESCO) which had been established by a Michigan corporation (Kal-Spice). Subsequently, ESESCO delivered spices to KalSpice under a purchase order which had been placed prior to the
nationalization. ESESCO brought suit to recover the purchase
price and, as in Lamborn, defendant filed a counterclaim based on
the expropriation. Kal-Spice also asserted a claim for damages
based on the expropriation in a complaint against the Ethiopian
government. The government filed a motion to dismiss under both
45
the FSIA and the act of state doctrine.1
The court in Ethiopian Spice did not address the jurisdictional
issue under the FSIA, preferring instead to base its dismissal of the
expropriation claims on the act of state doctrine. 46 Its discussion of
Dunhill consisted of only one sentence, in which it summarized the
Lamborn ruling that the Cuban action involved in that case "was
clearly public and governmental in nature, as opposed to private
and commercial." 147 That ruling was held equally applicable to the
Ethiopian expropriation because there had been "no suggestion that
the [Ethiopian government] was engaged in purely commercial
48
activity equivalent to that of private merchants." 1
The Seventh Circuit was recently faced with a similar fact
pattern in Alberti v. Empresa Nicaraguensede la Came.14 Nicara-

144. 543 F. Supp. 1224 (W.D. Mich. 1982).
145. Id. at 1225-27.
146. Ethiopian Spice, 543 F. Supp. at 1227-33. By so proceeding, the court's decision
addressed both the counterclaim against ESESCO and the complaint against the Ethiopian
government. Jurisdiction was not in issue on the expropriation claim against ESESCO since
the latter had initiated the action. See 28 U.S.C. § 1607 (1976).
147. Ethiopian Spice, 543 F. Supp. at 1229.
148. Id. This observation is similar to the observation of the Second Circuit in Lamborn
that there was no indication that the Cuban nationalization was anything other than the
"governmental action of a sovereign which it purported to be." Lamborn, 652 F.2d at 238.
The court in Ethiopian Spice noted that "ESESCO was one of one hundred entities subjected
to nationalization." Ethiopian Spice Extraction Share Co., 543 F. Supp. at 1229. Whether
this fact assisted the court in reaching its conclusion that the nationalization was a "public
governmental act" is unclear. Id. The breadth of a governmental measure is a factor
militating against a finding of commercial activity. See Mirabella v. Banco Indus. de la Rep.
Argen., 101 Misc. 2d 767, 421 N.Y.S.2d 960 (Sup. Ct. 1979).
149. 705 F.2d 250 (7th Cir. 1983).
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gua had nationalized plaintiffs' thirty-five percent interest in a
Nicaraguan corporation engaged in the business of slaughtering
livestock and packaging beef, and subsequently operated the business through a state company. Plaintiffs then purchased beef from
the state enterprise but refused to pay the purchase price. The
action sought recovery for wrongful conversion of plaintiffs' stock
in the Nicaraguan corporation and a declaratory judgment that
plaintiffs were entitled to offset the purchase price for the beef
against the value of the nationalized stock. Jurisdiction was alleged
50
to exist under both sections 1605(a)(2) and 1605(a)(3).1
Arguing that section 1605(a)(2) applied, plaintiffs sought to
link their suit to a commercial activity carried on by defendants in
the United States since the state agency's sale of beef to plaintiffs
was a commercial activity having contact with this country. 5 1 The
court ruled, however, that the sales transaction, although commercial,
has nothing to do with this lawsuit beyond the fact that it gave
rise to the debt plaintiffs seek to offset. The basis of this lawsuit
is the nationalization of Empacadora, which is a quintessential
Government act. . . . Plaintiffs cannot transform this governmental dispute into a commercial dispute through the simple
expedient of attempting to offset an unrelated commercial
debt. 1 2
Thus, the Seventh Circuit was not influenced by the subsequent commercial operation of the nationalized business by the
state agency, even though that commercial operation led to a sale of
beef to plaintiffs. Much like the court in D'Angelo v. Petroleos
Mexicanos,15 3 the Alberti court drew a clear distinction between the
nationalization itself and the commercial operation which followed. No mention was made of the Iranian cases discussed above,
as the court implicitly rejected the "in connection with" rationale
upon which those cases were based. By contrast, the district court's

150.
151.
152.
153.
434 U.S.

Id. at 252-55.
Id. at 254.
Id. (citations omitted).
422 F. Supp. 1280 (D. Del. 1976), aJJ'd, 564 F.2d 89 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
1035 (1978). See supra text accompanying notes 85-88.
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opinion in Carey v. National Oil Corp. 154 was cited with approval. 155 The Seventh Circuit had joined the Second Circuit in
reaffirming the traditional view of nationalization as a sovereign
act. 156
CONCLUSION
Neither the FSIA nor Dunhill effected a radical break with
prior law on the characterization of nationalizations. With certain
exceptions, the case law since the passage of the FSIA and Dunhill
confirms that nationalization is still considered the quintessentially
sovereign act. Therefore, while other exceptions to sovereign immunity and the act of state doctrine may be applicable in certain cases,
an action based upon a nationalization is not likely to fit within
either the FSIA's commercial activity exception to immunity or the
"commercial activity" exception to the act of state doctrine.
154. 453 F. Supp. 1097 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), alf'd on other grounds, 592 F.2d 673 (2d Cir.
1979).
155. Alberti, 705 F.2d at 254.
156. See Lamborn, 652 F.2d at 231; Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 550 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 984 (1977). See also supra text accompanying notes 89-96, 135-42
(Second Circuit decisions on nationalization as a sovereign act).

